Vertical separation of transmission control and market efficiency in the wholesale electricity market

This study examines how vertical separation of transmission control affects the wholesale market efficiency in the electric power industry. We analyze a unique regional electricity wholesale market in the U.S. where initially restructuring only occurred in the transmission sector. Following a commonly-used best dispatch model (Wolfram, 1999; Borenstein et al., 2002), we simulate competitive benchmark prices and compare with the best estimates available for actual prices to measure price-cost markups of the wholesale market. Empirical results demonstrate that the vertical separation of transmission control led to a significant increase in market markups in peak-load hours, documenting evidence of enhanced market power. Although we also find a reduction in the price-cost margin in low-demand hours, we reserve caution for this finding.     

Effect of CEO power and board strength on bank performance in China

Given that a powerful CEO is more likely to overcome problems and control performance in a firm, this study first focuses on exploring whether CEO power positively affects certain measures of bank performance and which sources of CEO power have these positive impacts. Next, this study further analyzes whether the positive impact of CEO power on performance is negatively mediated by board strength. Our sample includes data on the three main types of Chinese banks for 2006 to –2016.Our results show that CEO structural power significantly improves a bank’s overall profitability, risk-taking ability and lending quality, CEO ownership power significantly raises a bank’s lending quality, and CEO expert power significantly increases a bank’s overall and shareholder profitability. As considering the endogeneity, CEO prestige power significantly improves a bank’s overall profitability. Next, we use the proportion of independent directors as our measure of board strength and find that a stronger board reduces the beneficial effects of CEO structural power on a bank’s lending quality, of CEO ownership power on shareholder profitability, and of CEO expert power on lending quality. There are similar harmful mediating effects when we use the proportion of foreign investors and board size as measures of board strength. Our results can help Chinese bank authorities develop policies to appropriately raise bank CEOs’ power and reduce board supervision of CEO power.     

粤港澳大湾区城市群区域治理机制的架构思考:从政府治理权出发

推进建设粤港澳大湾区城市群,尤其应当重视各级政府在该区域治理机制架构中的地位。协调不同法域、不同层级和不同类型地方政府之间的治理权,是推进该城市群协调发展,并率先推进实现新型城镇化转型的基础和保障。就该区域而言,政府治理权的架构可以分为三个层次:根据中央顶层设计的区域布局,推动地方政府转换行使治理权的视阈,合理安排不同地方政府治理权,并建立权力协作机制;由此机制出发,协调区域内各地方的发展方向,深化彼此之间利益共生关系;最后,与利益共享对应,还应当配合财政供给改革,实现区域治理责任的成本共担。     

Optimal targeting of latent tourism demand segments

This paper identifies for the first time the optimal target markets employing the latent tourism demand expenditure, a novel concept in tourism literature. The study quantifies latent tourism demand between each pair of origin-destination through distinguishing by type of tourism and seasonality. It works with market shares that are estimated via a fractional regression model. Moreover, latent demand is clustered using a market segmentation approach based on a latent class regression. Finally, the optimal target markets are chosen depending on the expected latent tourism expenditure. The result has clear policy implications in terms of which markets are promoted, the optimal channels of communication and the maximum budget for each marketing campaign.     

European quanto option pricing in presence of liquidity risk

In this paper, we study the pricing problems of the European quanto options in which the underlying foreign asset is in imperfectly liquid markets. First, we assume that the dynamics of the underlying foreign asset price are affected by market liquidity and propose a liquidity-adjusted quanto model. This allows for the effects of market liquidity on European quanto option pricing. And then we derive the analytical pricing formulas for four different types of European quanto options. Finally, we empirically investigate the pricing performance of our proposed model with a European quanto construction involving the SSE 50 ETF, as the underlying asset, and the CNY/HKD exchange rate. Empirical results demonstrate that the pricing accuracy of the proposed model is markedly superior to that of the Black-Scholes quanto model. In other words, allowing for liquidity risk in the framework of European quanto option pricing can make markedly improvements in fitting the real market data. Particularly, the improvement rate is high for medium-term and out-of-the-money options. Moreover, these results are robust for different liquidity measures.     

管理层权力与或有事项信息披露——基于环境不确定性的调节效应研究

基于2003—2016年我国A股上市公司的经验数据，以企业表内列报的预计负债金额与表外附注中披露的或有事项频数为考察对象，实证检验了管理层权力对或有事项信息披露的影响。研究发现，管理层权力与表内列报的或有事项信息显著负相关，而与表外披露的或有事项信息显著正相关；进一步发现，随着环境不确定性的增加，管理层权力对企业表内预计负债列报的负向影响显著增强，而对表外或有事项披露的正向影响明显减弱。在当前外部环境瞬息万变、内部治理机制弱化的背景下，管理层可能会利用其控制权操控或有事项信息的披露方式，自我服务偏好明显。     

环境政策工具对生态创新的影响: 研究回顾及实践意义

各种环境政策工具用来推进生态创新的开发、传播与应用，但不同政策工具对生态创新的作用效果还有待进一步挖掘。系统梳理了环境政策工具对生态创新影响的相关研究，探究不同政策工具的作用及其本质，以理解在推动生态创新开发、传播与应用情景下环境政策工具的作用及其实践意义。     

Hedging and temporal permit issuances in cap-and-trade programs: The Market Stability Reserve under risk aversion

Cap-and-trade programs such as the European Union's Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) expose firms to considerable risks, to which the firms can respond with hedging. We develop an intertemporal stochastic equilibrium model to analyze the implications of hedging by risk-averse firms. We show that the resulting time-varying risk premium depends on the size of the permit bank. Applying the model to the EU ETS, we find that hedging can lead to a U-shaped price path, because prices initially fall due to negative risk premiums and then rise as the hedging demand declines. The Market Stability Reserve (MSR) reduces the permit bank and thus, increases the hedging value of the permits. This offers an explanation for the recent price hike, but also implies that prices may decline in the future due to more negative risk premiums. In addition, we find higher permit cancellations through the MSR than previous analyses, which do not account for hedging.     

Mechanics of good trade execution in the framework of linear temporary market impact

We define the concept of good trade execution and we construct explicit adapted good trade execution strategies in the framework of linear temporary market impact. Good trade execution strategies are dynamic, in the sense that they react to the actual realisation of the traded asset price path over the trading period; this is paramount in volatile regimes, where price trajectories can considerably deviate from their expected value. Remarkably, however, the implementation of our strategies does not require the full specification of an SDE evolution for the traded asset price, making them robust across different models. Moreover, rather than minimising the expected trading cost, good trade execution strategies minimise trading costs in a pathwise sense, a point of view not yet considered in the literature. The mathematical apparatus for such a pathwise minimisation hinges on certain random Young differential equations that correspond to the Euler–Lagrange equations of the classical Calculus of Variations. These Young differential equations characterise our good trade execution strategies in terms of an initial value problem that allows for easy implementations.     

To push performance,check the leader’s power motive

The power motive, defined as the desire to impact the behavior and emotions of another person, has long been controversial. On one side, the exercise of power has been put forth as a fundamental human need greater in strength than the need to survive. On the other, it has been vilified for its potentially devastating consequences. We argue the latter view is distorted, and, by relying too heavily on it, we have come to misunderstand the essential nature of power and its use by leaders charged with driving performance. It is not the power motive that leads to corruption and tyranny, but rather how the power motive is channeled into behavior by other personality factors. Consequently, those charged with leader selection should place greater emphasis on how individuals with strong power motives differ in how they channel power. Doing so will support the selection of executives best equipped to deliver organizational performance.